To assess the effects of a firm's network of relations on innovation, this paper elaborates a theoretical framework that relates three aspects of a firm's ego network-direct ties, indirect ties, and structural holes (disconnections between a firm's partners)-to the firm's subsequent innovation output. It posits that direct and indirect ties both have a positive impact on innovation but that the impact of indirect ties is moderated by the number of a firm's direct ties. Structural holes are proposed to have both positive and negative influences on subsequent innovation. Results from a longitudinal study of firms in the international chemicals industry indicate support for the predictions on direct and indirect ties, but in the interfirm collaboration network, increasing structural holes has a negative effect on innovation. Among the implications for interorganizational network theory is that the optimal structure of interfirm networks depends on the objectives of the network members.@ Several recent studies have indicated that the positions of firms in interorganizational networks influence firm behavior and outcomes (e.g., Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997). Because of their facilitative role in various interorganizational contexts, network relationships have even been described as network resources (Gulati, 1999) . In spite of the growing consensus that networks matter, however, the specific effects of different elements of network structure on organizational performance remain unclear. In the social networks literature, a debate has arisen over the form of network structures that can appropriately be regarded as beneficial (Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997). According to one view, densely embedded networks with many connections linking ego's alters are facilitative for ego, and social structures are seen as advantageous to the extent that networks are "closed" (Coleman, 1988 ; Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997). According to an alternate view, however, social structural advantages derive from the brokerage opportunities created by an open social structure (Burt, 1992) . Actors can build relationships with multiple disconnected clusters and use these connections to obtain information and control advantages over others (Burt, 1992) . From the perspective of the network theorist, these differences have different, even contradictory, normative implications (Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997). From Coleman's (1988) standpoint, the optimal social structure is one generated by building dense, interconnected networks. From Burt's (1992) position, constructing networks consisting of disconnected alters is the optimal strategy. Clarifying the implications of cohesive versus disconnected network structures for various organizational outcomes is important to our understanding of network resources.
Relatedly, recent research has led to the important insight that building networks with large numbers of indirect ties may be an effective way for actors to enjoy the benefits of network size without paying the costs of network maintenance associated with direct ties (Burt, 1992) . Although such a strategy is undoubtedly conceptually attractive, it appears likely that its value in a given circumstance will be contingent on several factors. Specifically, the relative value of direct ver-425/Administrative Science Quarterly, 45 (2000): 425-455 sus indirect ties is likely to depend on the degree to which the benefits provided by direct and indirect ties are similar in magnitude and content. To the extent that direct ties provide different types or amounts of benefits, the possibilities of substitution between direct and indirect ties may be limited. Thus, examining the content and relative contribution of direct and indirect ties may also be relevant from the perspective of designing effective and efficient networks.
In this study, I examine the relationship between a firm's position in the industry network of interfirm collaborative linkages and its innovation output, a significant organizational outcome. Scholars in the innovation and interorganizational learning literatures have argued that linkages and the resultant collaboration networks are key vehicles through which firms obtain access to external knowledge (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996) . Examining the relationship between network position and innovation output can provide both an elucidation of the role of different elements of network structure in the innovation process and an empirical indicator of the effectiveness of knowledge flows through such networks. For the purposes of this study, I define an interfirm collaborative linkage as a voluntary arrangement between independent organizations to share resources. Further, following past research, I make a distinction between collaborative arrangements that involve a technological component, such as developing a new technology or sharing a manufacturing process, and collaborative arrangements that are focused purely on sharing marketing assets or brand names (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Singh and Mitchell, 1996) . Similarly, I make a distinction between horizontal and vertical linkages (Stuart, 1998; Gulati and Lawrence, 1999). For analytic clarity and focus, in this paper, I restrict my attention to horizontal, technical linkages, i.e., technical linkages between firms in the same industry.
NETWORK STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION OUTPUT
Although sociologists have long studied the relationship between network structure and innovation, most research in this tradition has largely focused on the adoption or diffusion of innovations. Even though articles in the popular press and academic reports of the innovation-generation process have consistently used network metaphors, until recently, relatively little work has actually used a network analytic approach to study innovation generation. Recently, however, a few pioneering studies have explored network structure from the perspective of innovation generation (Shan, Walker, and Kogut, 1994; Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996). For instance, Podolny and Stuart (1995) explored the factors that determine whether an innovation becomes a technological dead end or serves as the basis for subsequent innovations. They found that this outcome was predicted by the pattern of ties in the technological niche of the innovation as well as by the quality of the innovation and the status of the innovator, but they did not directly examine the role of the interfirm network structure as a predictor of innovation output.
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I Other studies that have examined the relationship between collaboration and innovation include Berg, Duncan, and Friedman (1982) and Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994), albeit from slightly different perspectives. Berg, Duncan, and Friedman (1982) examined the impact of research collaboration on research expenditures and profitability. Similarly, Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) related collaboration to profitability. Neither of these studies, however, directly examined the impact of collaboration on innovative output or used a network perspective.
Two other studies that have explored the nexus between network structure and innovation performance serve as one proximate point of departure for the current research.1 In a study of biotechnology start-ups, Shan, Walker, and Kogut (1994) predicted and found that one element of a firm's network position, the number of collaborative relationships it formed, was positively related to its innovation output. Through block modeling, they also developed a more sophisticated measure of a firm's network position and found that this measure was a good predictor of linkage formation, but they did not explore the possibility that elements of a firm's ego network, other than the number of direct ties, might influence innovation output. In another study, Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr (1996) traced the formation of interfirm learning networks for biotechnology start-ups and found that centrality in such networks is related to faster subsequent growth (in number of employees) for the start-ups, but they also did not directly examine the impact of network positions on innovation.
A recent stream of literature that has examined the role of different network structures in facilitating outcomes for network constituents forms the other point of departure for this study. In his book, Burt (1992) made a strong case for the strategic configuration of networks. According to this conception, designing networks to maximize disconnections (or structural holes) between alters and selecting alters with many other partners (or many indirect ties) are two mechanisms by which actors can develop efficient and effective networks. This conception, however, raises two issues. First, as some scholars have noted, the normative importance accorded to structural holes by this approach is at odds with other theoretical perspectives that stress the importance of closed social networks (Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997). Second, the strategy of substituting indirect ties for direct ones that is endorsed by the effective networks conception presumes that direct and indirect ties offer the same content to the focal actor. The validity of that assumption may vary significantly across networks.
The two issues raised above have important implications for modeling the impact of network structure on organizational outcomes. For instance, the debate on structural holes suggests that an accurate understanding of the role of structural holes in the collaboration network must account for both Coleman's and Burt's variants of the argument. Similarly, recognizing the possibility that even within the same network, direct and indirect ties may vary in their content highlights the importance of decomposing the firm's ego network into distinct and separate elements and identifying the contents transmitted through each type of tie.
In the technological collaboration network that I studied, interfirm collaborative linkages are associated with two distinct kinds of network benefits. First, they can provide the benefit of resource sharing, allowing firms to combine knowledge, skills, and physical assets. Second, collaborative linkages can provide access to knowledge spillovers, serving as information conduits through which news of technical breakthroughs, new insights to problems, or failed approaches 427/ASQ, September 2000 travels from one firm to another. In distinguishing between the resource-sharing and knowledge-spillover benefits of collaboration, it is important to distinguish between know-how and information (Kogut and Zander, 1992) . Know-how entails accumulated skills and expertise in some activity and is likely to include a significant tacit or noncodifiable dimension. Information refers primarily to facts, discrete quanta of information that can be transmitted through simple communication in relatively complete form and without loss of integrity (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Szulanski, 1996) . The resource-sharing benefits of collaboration relate primarily to the transfer and sharing of know-how and physical assets, while the knowledge-spillover benefits are likely to involve predominantly information.
Three aspects of a firm's network structure are likely to be relevant in connection with the above benefits: (1) the number of direct ties maintained by a firm, (2) the number of indirect ties maintained by the firm (the firms it can reach in the network through its partners and their partners), and (3) the degree to which a firm's partners are linked to each other (i.e., whether there are structural holes in the firm's ego network). Each of these three dimensions of a firm's network, its direct ties, indirect ties, and connections between partners, can influence the firm's innovation performance. A firm's direct ties potentially provide both resource-sharing and knowledgespillover benefits. Indirect ties do not entail formal resourcesharing benefits but can provide access to knowledge spillovers. Finally, the degree of connectivity between a firm's partners influences both resource sharing and access to novel information, albeit in contradictory ways. The degree to which indirect ties benefit the focal firm, however, is likely to be contingent on the number of the focal firm's existing direct ties, such that firms with few direct ties are likely to enjoy greater benefits from their indirect ties than firms with many direct ties. Two arguments support this line of reasoning. First, the relative addition to knowledge through indirect ties is likely to be greater for firms with few direct ties than for firms with many direct ties. For firms with limited access to the network through direct ties, the information provided by indirect ties may represent a significant increment to the firm's existing information base, while firms with many direct ties are already privy to a significant proportion of the knowledge flow of the network through their direct ties. The additional access to information provided by their indirect ties may then represent only a marginal increment in their knowledge base.
Second, firms with many direct ties may also be more limited in their ability to profit from information from their indirect ties. When a firm's partners have many connections, the information that reaches the firm through the network also reaches many others, the other partners of its partners. These partners potentially represent competition for the firm in using this information. When information circulates among many potential users, the alertness, responsiveness, and flexibility of individual users is likely to determine the benefit that they obtain from it (Zaheer and Zaheer, 1997). Firms with many direct ties may be more constrained in their ability to absorb new information or respond to it as flexibly as firms with few direct ties (Glasmeier, 1991) . Firms with many direct ties, being in the thick of things, are less likely to add to their knowledge or to absorb as much knowledge through their indirect ties than are firms with few direct ties, which is likely to have an effect on innovation:
Hypothesis 3: The impact of indirect ties on a firm's innovation output will be moderated by the level of the firm's direct ties: the greater the number of direct ties, the smaller the benefit from indirect ties.
Structural Holes and Innovation
Recent research suggests that a third dimension of a firm's ego network is also likely to be important to innovation: the degree of connectivity (or the lack of it) between a firm's partners (Burt, 1992 consequently, to many distinct information flows. Thus, maximizing the structural holes spanned or minimizing redundancy between partners is an important aspect of constructing an efficient, information-rich network (Burt, 1992) .
From the perspective of structural hole theory, ego networks in which a firm's partners have no links with each other are preferred to networks in which its partners are densely tied to each other, but examining the impact of a network rich in structural holes on the resource-sharing benefits of the network reveals a conclusion that is almost diametrically opposite to the conclusion reached by relating knowledge spillover or information benefits to the same network structure. The resource-sharing benefits of collaboration arise from firms combining their skills, sharing their knowledge, and conducting joint projects to obtain scale economies, all of which presume the existence of significant trust between the partners. linked to each other, the possibility of opportunistic actions is greater.
The contradictory effects of connections between partners thus prompt two competing predictions with respect to the relationship between structural holes and innovation. Many structural holes in ego's network will increase ego's access to diverse information and, hence, enhance innovation output. Conversely, ego networks with fewer structural holes might promote trust generation and reduce opportunism, leading to more productive collaboration from the perspective of resource sharing.
Hypothesis 4a: The greater the structural holes spanned by a firm, the greater the firm's subsequent innovation output.
Hypothesis 4b: The greater the structural holes spanned by a firm, the less the firm's subsequent innovation output.
METHODS
I chose to conduct my research in the chemicals industry for several reasons. First, technological collaboration has been and continues to be a significant feature of this industry. Second, patents are a meaningful measure of innovation in this industry. The link between patents and innovation is likely to be stronger in industries in which patents provide firms with fairly strong protection for their proprietary knowledge. Prior research indicates that the chemicals industry is one in which patents are generally regarded to be effective and used widely and consistently, relative to most other industries (Levin et al., 1987) . 1 tested the hypotheses on a longitudinal data set comprising the linkage and patenting activities of 97 leading firms from the chemicals industry in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. The sample was selected to include the largest chemicals firms in these three areas, which constitute the core of the global chemicals industry, to ensure the availability and reliability of data. Information on the key variable, collaborative linkages, is extremely difficult to obtain for smaller firms over an extended time period. Past network studies on alliances have used a similar strategy of focusing on the leading firms in an industry (Gulati, 1995; Gualti and Garguilo, 1999).
Innovation output, the dependent variable, was measured through the patenting frequency of each firm, the number of patents received in a given year. Patents are an important measure of innovation output because they are directly related to inventiveness, they represent an externally validated measure of technological novelty (Griliches, 1990), and they confer property rights on the assignee and therefore have economic significance (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Scherer and Ross, 1990 The situation was quite different for research agreements and technology development and sharing arrangements not involving the formation of a separate entity. For such agreements, I coded dissolution based on the tenure specified in the formation announcement or on a formal notice of conclusion of the research, when available. For long-term (multiyear) or general programs of research, one of the two above conditions was often the case. In the majority of cases, however, I was unable to establish formal dissolutions. In such cases, I presumed the agreement to exist until the last year in which it was documented or until the year after the year it was founded, whichever was later. The assumption that such agreements have a short life relative to joint ventures is consistent with the specific and short-term nature of their objectives in most cases. For research agreements, there were also~cases in which the existence or ongoing activities of a collaboration were discussed but the founding of the collaboration itself was not reported or indicated. In such cases, I treated the collaboration as having been founded in the year immediately prior to the year in which it was first documented. Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) also provided a fixedeffects estimator for count data that handles unobserved heterogeneity by computing within-firm estimates of the coefficients. In this approach, only the variation within a firm across time is used to estimate the regression coefficients. Thus, unobserved variations between firms are not problematic because between-firm variation is not used in the computations of the estimates. In this paper, for robustness, I used both fixed effects and random effects to estimate the models. 
Measures
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It is conventional to control for firm-size effects in analyses of innovative productivity (Cohen and Levin, 1989 I also included variables to control for the profitability and liquidity of firms. Profitability was captured through a return on assets variable, while liquidity was represented through the current ratio (ratio of current assets to current liabilities). Over time, innovation rates can increase or decrease for all firms. I controlled for such period effects by including a series of dummies for every year from 1981 to 1990, 1991 being the omitted category. I also included control variables for the nationality of the firms; Japan and USA were dummy variables coded to equal 1 for Japanese and American firms, respectively. European firms constituted the omitted category. related with each other, as would be expected. Among the independent variables, the measure for structural holes is correlated with the three measures for indirect ties.2
RESULTS
In table 3, I report the results of the regression analyses using the random-effects Poisson estimators. Model 1 presents the base model with only the control variables. Model 2 adds the direct ties variable to the specification. Models 3a through 3c add the three measures of indirect ties, respectively. Models 4a through 4c add the interaction terms, Direct ties x Indirect ties (three measures), and models 5a through 5c add the structural holes variables to complete the specification. I use the complete specification (models 5a to 5c) to discuss the results. Several of the control variable results are also significant (models 5a, 5b, and 5c). Technological distance between partners was negative and significant, supporting the argument that absorptive capacity issues are likely to be important in the context of technology alliances (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Stuart, 1998). R&D and firm size are both positively associat-444/ASQ, September 2000 3 I also conducted several supplementary analyses to evaluate the robustness of the results, including reestimating the models after centering the direct ties and indirect ties variables on their means prior to creating the interaction terms, using a Poisson fixed-effect specification instead of the random effects reported here, and repeating the analyses with a sample of firms with two or more linkages only. The results (available from the author) were very similar to the reported results. To further investigate the possibilities of collinearity problems, I randomly omitted observations from the full sample to create 300 subsamples, each of which had between 650 and 900 observations. I then reestimated these models on all 300 subsamples. A warning sign of collinearity problems is that omitting even a few observations can cause significant changes in the coefficient estimates and drive them to insignificance or cause the coefficients to be significant but reversed in sign (Greene, 1997: 420). Even though in half the samples more than one-third of the observations were omitted, these sensitivity analyses provided strong support for the reported results. ed with patenting frequency, The estimated coefficient, however, is significantly less than unity in all three specifications. If the regressor variables are in log form, as it is for these two variables, then the coefficients of the Poisson specification can also be interpreted as elasticities of the regressor variable with respect to the dependent variable. Here, the positive but less than unity coefficient on R&D and firm size indicates that patenting frequency increases with R&D expenditures and firm size, but it does so less than proportionately. This is broadly consistent with past research (Acs and Audretsch, 1988, 1991) . This study examined the impact of three aspects of a firm's ego network-direct ties, indirect ties and structural holeson the innovation output of the firm. The theoretical framework suggested that the three aspects of network structure play different roles in the innovation process. According to this framework, direct ties serve as sources of resources and information, indirect ties serve primarily as sources of information, and structural holes between partners serve two contradictory roles. They expand the diversity of information that the firm has access to but also increase the firm's exposure to potential malfeasance. In this study, I predicted, and found, that direct and indirect ties influence innovation output positively, but the impact of indirect ties is moderated by the firm's level of direct ties. Finally, I presented competing predictions about the effect of structural holes in the focal firm's network and found that, at least in this interfirm collaboration network, increasing structural holes decreases innovation output. The findings have some important theoretical implications.
Collaboration Networks
This study was motivated by two theoretical puzzles and their implications for firms in interorganizational networks. First, I sought to evaluate the idea that building networks with large numbers of indirect ties may be an effective way for actors to enjoy the benefits of network size without paying the costs of network maintenance associated with direct ties (Burt, 1992) . Second, I sought to understand the degree to which closed or open networks could be appropriately regarded as the normative ideal (Coleman, 1988; Burt, 1992;  Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997). The arguments and conclusions of this study shed some light on both of these issues.
The results of this study both vindicate and qualify the prescription to use indirect ties as an efficient and effective way of maximizing network benefits. In an interfirm technology linkage network, a firm's indirect ties serve as a mechanism for knowledge spillovers and contribute positively and significantly to its innovation output. Given that, unlike direct ties, indirect ties entail relatively low or no maintenance costs for the firm, these benefits are extremely welcome. Thus, the results provide support for the basic premise that network effectiveness can be enhanced through indirect ties (Burt, 1992) . But the paper also suggests that caution is required before interpreting these results as a mandate to build large networks of indirect ties. The arguments and findings of this paper draw attention to three factors that need to be considered before embarking on a strategy of substituting indirect for direct ties.
First, this study highlights the fact that even within the same network, direct ties and indirect ties can differ significantly in the nature or content of benefits that they provide to the focal actor. Although I did not directly measure the contents of direct and indirect ties, I argued that in the interfirm linkage network these ties differ in the nature of benefits offered: direct ties provide resource-sharing and informationspillover benefits, but indirect ties provide only the latter. Clearly, under these circumstances, the degree of substitu-448/ASQ, September 2000 tion possible between direct and indirect ties is limited. More generally, this finding suggests that the value of a strategy of substituting indirect ties for direct ties will vary significantly across networks. In any network, an analysis of the substantive benefit provided by each kind of tie must be conducted before a network reconfiguration is attempted.
A second aspect, closely related to the previous one, is that even when direct and indirect ties provide the same kind of benefit, the magnitude of the benefits provided by indirect ties may be significantly different from those provided by direct ties. The results of this paper suggest that the actual magnitude of benefits from indirect ties is relatively low. Although this result could be peculiar to this setting, one argument suggests that this result may actually be more widely applicable. This conclusion is based on one key insight: in many networks, indirect ties simultaneously play two different roles vis-6-vis the focal actor. On the one hand, they are resources that extend the actor's reach in the network and improve his or her access to information. On the other hand, in many networks, such indirect ties are also competitors of the focal actor in terms of using such information. To illustrate this dual aspect of indirect ties, figure 2 (adapted from Burt, 1992) shows a firm X that builds a direct tie to a partner (1) who has three other partners (2, 3, and 4). These three indirect ties (firms 2, 3, and 4) are now potentially providers of information to the focal firm (X), and news of new technical developments arising in one of these firms can make its way to the focal firm through the common partner (1). Thus, adding the indirect ties has extended the focal firm's information reach in the network significantly. Yet moving our focus away from the focal firm and onto the indirect ties themselves draws attention to another, less benign aspect of this network. These indirect ties, linked to the focal firm through the common partner, are also linked to each other through the same common partner. Information that arises in one of these indirect ties, say Firm 2, reaches the focal firm, but it also reaches the other indirect ties, Firms 3 and 4. If the same information can be used profitably by the other firms, and one firm's use of it precludes its most fruitful use by another, then the network benefits that accrue to the focal firm are likely to be much smaller than might otherwise be anticipated by a simple consideration of its expanded reach. More generally, this argument suggests that the degree to which indirect ties provide benefits of greater informational reach will vary by the nature of the information and the network. To the extent that the sources of information in many networks are also potential users of similar information, competition to use the information within the clusters in which it originates can reduce the benefits that ego can expect from even an effectively configured network.
The negative interaction between direct and indirect ties suggests a third reason to be careful in terms of evaluating the impact of indirect ties. Although individually higher numbers of direct ties and indirect ties are both beneficial, having many indirect and many direct ties is not necessarily better. Between the more limited addition to their knowledge base through their indirect ties and their more constrained ability to absorb and act on the information, actors with many direct ties may be unable to profit from their indirect ties as can actors with fewer direct ties. Thus, in addition to being limited in magnitude, the value of indirect ties is also likely to be contingent on the number of a firm's direct ties (see also Burt, 1997 ). This conclusion is likely to apply in particular to networks such as the one described above, in which many actors can potentially use the same information. In such networks, alertness, responsiveness, and flexibility are likely to be important in terms of profitably using information obtained through network ties (Zaheer and Zaheer, 1997).
The above arguments suggest several mechanisms that potentially limit the benefits of indirect ties, but my objective in presenting these arguments is not to indicate that indirect ties are inferior to direct ties or vice versa. Rather, it is to draw attention to a broader conclusion: whether direct ties are more productive than indirect ties depends on the context being studied, and the effects of ties, whether direct or indirect, are likely to be contingent on several factors. The nature and content of the ties, the type of outcome being studied, and the broader network structure within which a tie is embedded are all likely to influence the value of a tie. Although, in this study, indirect ties provided relatively less significant benefits than direct ties, that conclusion is unlikely to be universally true. For instance, in Bian's (1997) analysis of job searches in China, direct ties provide only an intermediation benefit by connecting potential employees with jobgranting officials, while the indirect tie in the form of the jobgranting official provides the more substantive benefit of an actual job.
The arguments and findings on structural holes further reinforce the basic conclusion that the impact of different net-450/ASQ, September 2000 work attributes and positions can only be understood relative to a particular context. The strategy of matching the type of benefit (resource sharing versus information spillovers) with the form of social structure (a closed versus an open network) by itself draws attention to the contradictory effects of network structure on innovation output. The results of the statistical analyses further contribute to illuminating the debate on the appropriate form of facilitative social structures. In interorganizational collaborations, it appears that the benefits of increasing trust, developing and improving collaboration routines, and reducing opportunism that are provided by a group of cohesive interconnected partners outweigh the disadvantages of not having the informational diversity that is provided by having many structural holes in a firm's network. Reconciling this result with that of an earlier study on structural holes and innovation is useful. In an interesting process study of innovation, Hargadon and Sutton (1 997) demonstrated how a firm exploits its position as the spanner of structural holes to develop new products. On the surface, the results of that study appear to conflict with the findings reported here, but a key difference between the network context they depict and the one studied here is relevant. In Hargadon and Sutton's (1997) study, the focal firm is a product-development consulting firm that bridges structural holes between clients in different industries. Here, the network consists of collaborative linkages between firms in the same industry. Thus, the nature of ties between firms varies significantly for the two networks. Collaboration and resource sharing between competitors, two salient features of this network, are not the issue in Hargadon and Sutton's network. Rather, the key principle there is brokerage. By contrast, in the collaboration between competitors that is studied here, developing norms of cooperation is likely to be especially important, hence the benefits of interconnected, closed networks. Again, the basic conclusion that emerges from the above comparison of results between this study and Hargadon and Sutton's (1997) study is that whether structural holes are good, bad, or irrelevant is liable to be a function of the context. When developing a collaborative milieu and overcoming opportunism are essential to success, closed networks are likely to be more beneficial. When speedy access to diverse information is essential, structural holes are likely to be advantageous.
My final point concerns the implications of the contingency arguments highlighted above for the broader, developing literature on network resources and social capital (Adler and Kwon, 1999) . Although the facilitative role of networks has led to their identification as network resources or social capital (Burt, 1997; Gulati, 1999) , and network attributes have been associated with several distinct benefits, such as trust, information, and power, scholars have been unable to agree on the form of social structures that constitute social capital or network resources. For instance, cohesion theorists have presented densely interconnected networks as the normative ideal (Coleman, 1988) . Conversely, others have emphasized the benefits of structural-hole-rich networks (Burt, 1992) . Scholars in a third tradition have argued that a network of partners exclusively tied to a focal actor is to be preferred to one in which the focal actor's partners have many other part-451/ASQ, September 2000 ners (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Brass and Burkhardt, 1992) . For the actor seeking to develop social capital, these positions suggest a confusing panoply of choices. At one level, the arguments of this paper add further complexity to this problem by highlighting the fact that each of these social structural choices in fact entails a significant trade-off between two potentially beneficial network outcomes. Densely interconnected networks enable trust but limit the inflow of diverse and fresh insights. Structural-hole-rich networks provide informational benefits but inhibit trust development. Partners exclusively tied to an actor provide power benefits, but it is partners with many other partners that provide the indirect ties that enhance his or her informational reach within the network. At another level, however, the conclusions of this study suggest a path out of this dilemma.
The arguments and results from this study suggest that the debate about the appropriate form of social capital may be profitably informed by the extension of an established principle of organization design to the network arena: the optimal structural design is contingent on the actions that the structure seeks to facilitate (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967 (Burt, 1992) . Such a network would be ideal for an organization whose primary business entails the brokerage of information or technology (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997). Identifying the benefit sought from a social structure is therefore likely to be critical in identifying the form of social structure that is most likely to be facilitative. What this study has shown is that there is no simple, universal answer.
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